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Philosophical Concepts in Radical Constructivism

> Context • In spite of its advantages and its ability to make valid responses to objections, radical constructivism is
not mainstream. > Problem • Extolling the virtues of radical constructivism and responding logically to the objections

22

does not work. We know this from the evidence of many attempts. Our theoretical stance, radical constructivism, also
suggests this approach is not likely to have much influence on realists. We cannot transmit understanding in the
signals with which we attempt to communicate. How can we in radical constructivism enable those outside of RC to
understand our explanation of human knowing? > Method • Examine our understanding of radical constructivism
itself, because it is an explanation of how, why and under what circumstances people change their understandings
of their experiential worlds. > Results • We must find ways to direct the attention of others to situations that they
cannot explain with their existing understanding of the world. Then we must create conditions conducive to their
revising and testing new understandings for fit with the evidence of their experience. > Implications • Since radical
constructivism is a theory of human knowing, it tells us how humans develop knowledge, hence it is an answer to
the questions central to this special issue. This answer is not one to be used to win in debates with realists. Radical
constructivism gives us an answer to the problem of engaging realists in understanding our position, but strategies
consistent with radical constructivism are not easily carried out. Developing and executing such strategies is the work
at hand. > Key words • History of science, paradigm change, physics education research, realism, folk theory of teaching, cognitive equilibration.

… it seems to me that the resistance [met by
Vico, Piaget and Ceccato] is not so much
due to inconsistencies or gaps in [radical
constructivism’s] argumentation as to the
justifiable suspicion that constructivism
intends to undermine too large a part of
the traditional view of the world.
Ernst von Glasersfeld (1984: 17)

Introduction
The term “answer” in the title of this
paper does not refer to an answer to the realists’ objections in order to convince them
they have lost the debates. Instead, it refers
to an answer as to why our efforts to respond
to realists in these debates seem to be so ineffective and an answer as to what we should
be doing instead. As the subtitle suggests,
this is not an easy answer. It is an answer
that we in radical constructivism (RC) have
available to us for use in our efforts, if we
wish to have realists at least understand our
position.
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This paper addresses two questions
raised by the guest editors in their editorial.
 Why are the advantages of RC not strong
enough to convince more scientists and
philosophers?
 Can the objections to RC be refuted in
a way that makes RC more attractive to
scientists and philosophers?
Both questions are asking why a disappointingly small change in understanding
RC has happened. In short, why is RC not
more mainstream? RC itself offers a way of
understanding why scientists and philosophers have not joined our ranks, but not if
we take the propositions given in the editorial as defining RC at face value:
1 | Knowledge is not passively received, but
is learnt through a process of active construction by the knower.
2 | The function of this process of learning is adaptive, and serves the knower’s
organization of her own experiential
world, not the discovery of an objectively existing ontological reality.
If we are going to take two basic propositions to define RC, then we need propositions that are more at the root of RC.

The first principle obviously gives rise to
the label “constructivism,” but this proposition is a consequence of a more fundamental
issue. When we miss the more fundamental
issue, we may fail to deploy the strength of
RC as an explanation of our world.
Why does knowledge have to be constructed and why cannot it be passively received? Because the knowledge referred to
here is our conceptions of how and why the
world around us works, in short our working explanation of the world. Following Max
Jammer (1957: 2–4), this knowledge can
be called “explanatory knowledge,” as opposed to experiential knowledge. A fundamental principle in RC is that explanation
exists only in the mind. We construct such
knowledge in our minds. This constructed
explanatory knowledge does not exist in any
physical way in the world around us in any
form that we can directly experience. Piaget
put it in these ways at various times:
“ Knowledge is not a copy of reality. To know an
object, to know an event, is not simply to look at
it and make a mental copy or image of it. To know
an object is to act on it.” (Piaget 1964: 177)
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“ It is clear there is an undeniable role played by
experience in cognitive development; however,
the influence of experience has not resulted in a
conception of knowledge as a simple copy of outside reality.” (Piaget 1972: 8)
“ To understand is to invent.” (Piaget 1976)

The first proposition is merely a consequence of this more fundamental principle
of RC. In other words, if this knowledge
cannot exist other than in the mind, then it
cannot be transmitted in any physical way
and, thus, can only be constructed by human beings in their minds.
One could also take issue with the verb,
“to learn,” used in both propositions. It is
entirely too easy to associate learning with
what is supposed to happen in the folk theory of teaching:
“ …teaching is the presentation of an established
canon by approved methods for the benefit of the
deserving.” (Dykstra 2005: 54)

In this folk theory if a teacher presents
correct elements of a canon of knowledge
by an approved method and if an intended
receiver of this transmitted knowledge has
sufficient mental ability and diligence of
effort, then the listener will successfully receive the knowledge into her mind. This is
a description of the most prevalent use of
the verb, “to learn,” in English and no doubt
in other languages with the equivalent verb.
Hence it seems it is too easy for the average
reader to “hear” a kind of mixed message in
Proposition 1. Von Glasersfeld expressed
this distinction between the everyday (realist) use of the verb, “to learn,” and a radical
constructivist view of the situation in the
following way:
“ When students can repeat something verbatim,
it is obvious that they have learned it. Whether
they have understood it is a question these tests
avoid.” (Glasersfeld 2001: 2)

This folk theory of teaching, transmitting the canon, does not actually work
(Dykstra 2005). In the sub-division of physics known as “physics education research”
(PER), this conclusion was an important
early motivation in the development of the
field.

“ The secondary educational experience does not
now promote logical thinking in most students…
If colleges and universities do not try to solve the
problem by assuming the responsibility for the
intellectual development of their students, but
continue to look at their primary purpose as the
transmission of information about the several
disciplines, the elementary and secondary schools
will continue to fail in their mission of truly educating students.” (McKinnon & Renner 1971:
1051–1052)
“ Telling them the correct answers in lucid lectures, explanations, or text presentations is futile.
This is what has been done before, and it has left
no trace on the students’ intellects.” (Arons 1976:
835)

Notice that McKinnon and Renner are
referring to what is now called “the folk
theory of teaching” in their indictment of
traditional instruction when they write, “…
but continue to look at their primary purpose
as the transmission of information about
the several disciplines…” Work in this field
of PER since the early 1970s continues to
confirm these observations and reveals that
alternatives to folk theory teaching make
significant differences in ways that were
suggested by McKinnon, Renner and Arons.
Examples of some of these alternatives will
be cited below.
Given the points made so far, a better set
of basic propositions to “define” RC might
be:
1 | Knowledge, in the sense of explanation,
understanding, and meaning, exists
only in the mind, not in any physical
form whatsoever, and is intended by the
knower to fit the evidence of experience
but can never be known to be a veridical description of a mind-independent
reality.
2 | When one becomes aware of a disequilibration between one’s existing explanatory schemes and one’s new experiences,
one is moved to restore equilibrium by
reconstructing the explanatory schemes;
that is, one adapts one’s explanatory
schemes to fit experience.1
1 | Under certain circumstances, usually
deemed negative or unnatural, the “offending”
experiences are avoided, swept under the carpet,
with the hope that they do not happen again. The

In these two new propositions intended
to better define RC, we have the basis for a
response to the questions raised by the guest
editors in their editorial. A very short answer is that the scientists and philosophers
have not experienced sufficient disequilibration between their existing, realism-based
explanatory schemes and their experiential
worlds. Until they experience disequilibration between these two things, there is no
reason, from a radical constructivist point
of view, to imagine that realists should have
any motivation to change what is so fundamental in their realist explanatory schemes.
Let us see how these revised propositions enable us to respond to the questions
raised by the guest editors.

Why are the advantages
of RC not strong enough
to convince more scientists
and philosophers?
The short answer is that presenting advantages of an idea is not what results in
convincing anyone to change their beliefs.
There is a very large body of research published in refereed journals in physics education research (PER) that shows that presenting “better” explanations to students makes
no significant difference to their conceptions of physical phenomena, no matter how
eloquently the story is told (Dykstra 2005) .
There are several sources that considered together can give an explanation for the
issue in this question. The theory of cognitive equilibration, devised by Jean Piaget
and his colleagues at the Center for Genetic
Epistemology, has something to offer (Piaget
1985). The philosopher of science, Thomas
Kuhn, while he was not a radical constructivist but at most a trivial constructivist,
in his notions of scientific revolution and
paradigms also has something to offer here
(Kuhn 1962; Hoyningen-Huene 1993).2
Piaget was interested in the origins of
human knowing. He and his colleagues
result is one of no development and certain destructive tensions.
2 | The distinction between trivial constructivisms and radical constructivisms is described
later in this article.
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found, from the very large quantity of interview transcripts collected over his 60-year
career, that it is possible to describe the development of human reasoning about the
world in a developmental sequence. More
importantly to our issues here, he and his
colleagues developed a theory of cognitive
equilibration. This theory can be used to explain how and why human beings develop
in their reasoning about the world around
them. It also can be used to explain how,
why and under what circumstances human beings construct new, more powerful
understandings concerning their experiential worlds. The central issue in the theory
of cognitive equilibration is well-captured
in the new second proposition defining RC
given in the introduction.
Kuhn is possibly the most influential
historian and philosopher of science of the
20th century. He introduced the notion of
paradigm and paradigm shift to explain
large-scale shifts in scientific theories. He
showed how other psychosocial factors are
equally as important as rational logic in scientists changing from one theory to another.
Kuhn suggested that there exist paradigms, which have been established by scientists who recruit others to join them. A
paradigm is organized around a world-view,
an explanatory system. The paradigm has
standard responses to prototypical problems
addressed by the explanatory system. The
paradigm becomes a complete, self-consistent package that rationally explains the
range of experiences considered important.
Other experience is deemed not important
and unnecessary to explain. The practice of
checking the prototypical examples to an
even higher degree of precision is a typical
activity called “normal science” by Kuhn.
A scientific revolution begins to happen
when some scientists in the paradigm can no
longer ignore certain experiences that cannot be explained by the explanatory system
of the paradigm. The actual revolution can
only be recognized in hindsight. Three examples of such experiences in physics are the
ultraviolet catastrophe in explaining black
body radiation, the photoelectric effect, and
special relativity. None could be explained
within the prevailing paradigm now known
as classical physics. Initially many held that
these were minor issues and would eventually be figured out within the paradigm.
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But, there were those who decided that they
could see no way to resolve these issues within the prevailing explanatory system but they
could see how to explain these “exceptions”
by abandoning the old explanatory system in
favor of a new ones, to explain atomic and
sub-atomic phenomena (quantum physics)
and to explain gravitational interactions (relativity), which became foundations of what
is called “modern physics.”
While Kuhn was not a radical constructivist, it appears that one can interpret his
description of scientific revolutions as similar to Piaget’s theory of cognitive equilibration and the new propositions describing
RC given above. However, Kuhn’s idea of a
paradigm plays a role in explaining resistance to change in explanatory systems. If
one’s explanatory system already adequately
explains the experiences one considers significant, then there is apparently equilibration between one’s explanatory knowledge
and one’s experiences, hence no need or tendency to make any significant adjustments
to one’s explanatory schemes. This describes
realists very well. They have no reason to
think of the world so profoundly differently
as is required in RC.
To be specific, the dominant paradigm
we are dealing with is realist. This realism is
illustrated in the two following descriptions.
“ . . .we postulate the objective existence of physical reality that can be known to our minds…with
an ever growing precision by the subtle play of
theory and experiment.” (de la Torre & Zamorano
2001: 103)
“ The metaphysical realist looks for knowledge that
matches reality in the same sense as you might
look for paint to match the color that is already
on the wall you have to repair. In the epistemologist’s case it is, of course, not color that concerns
him, but some kind of ‘homomorphism,’ which is
to say, an equivalence of relations, a sequence, or
a characteristic structure – something, in other
words, that he can consider the same, because
only then could he say that his knowledge is of the
world.” (Glasersfeld 1984: 20–21, emphasis in the
original)

Within realism the folk theory of teaching completely explains the experience of
teachers in the classroom. This is what a
good paradigm does. The teacher’s respon-

sibility is to know the canon correctly and to
present it using an established method. The
teacher then checks to see if the students
“got” what was presented by testing to see if
they can reproduce what was presented in
some manner on exams. The students who
seem to have “gotten” what was presented
are considered deserving, that is, apparently
of requisite mental ability and diligence of
effort. Students, who did not “get” what was
presented, apparently are not deserving, that
is, do not have the requisite mental abilities
or even with the requisite mental abilities
did not work hard enough.
In this realist paradigm exemplified in
the folk theory of teaching, all is accounted
for. There is no disequilibrium. RC attempts
to describe another explanatory system and
urge that a realist change paradigms. From
the realist’s point of view, there is no need
and the cost of change is too great.
This paints a rather bleak picture for RC’s
chances against the hegemony of realism
current today. Yet, when a need is perceived,
costs can be surmounted. Needs, costs…
what are these all about? In this situation we
are referring to the disequilibration-driven
need to change one’s explanatory schemes to
fit new experiences that cannot be explained
with existing schemes, as in the new Proposition 2 concerning RC given in the “Opening” section. Such changes in explanatory
schemes rarely leave one’s whole structure
of explanatory schemes intact (Carey 1987).
Changes ripple through the whole network
as it is adjusted to be internally consistent.
The costs are the costs of change. There
is the change of certain aspects of one’s selfimage. There is the change in one’s particular place in the social order in which one
exists. Ego plays a large role here. If we are
talking about teaching and learning, there
are the costs associated with the development of a whole new pedagogical practice
and the consequent development of new
instructional materials and activities, none
of which happen in a short period of time
without any problems. Yet, these costs are
borne out of necessity because the new explanatory schemes cannot be reversed or rescinded. The person has constructed a new
world with which the old ways are incommensurate and new ways, for example, new
pedagogical practices, now make perfect
sense.
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Eric Mazur, a physicist on the faculty
at Harvard, relates his conversion story
in print and in presentations. Mazur had
come across the work of Ibrahim Abou
Halloun and David Hestenes (Halloun &
Hestenes 1985a, 1985b, 1987; Hestenes
1987).
“ [A]fter a couple of months of physics instruction, all students can recite Newton’s third law
and most of them can apply it in numerical
problems. A little probing, however, quickly
shows that many students do not understand
the law. [M]y first reaction was ‘Not my students…!’ … I decided to test my own students’
conceptual understanding, as well as that of the
physics majors at Harvard.
“ The first warning came when I gave the … test
to my class and a student asked, ‘Professor Mazur, how should I answer these questions? According to what you taught us, or by the way I
think about these things?’ [T]he results of the
test came as a shock: the students fared hardly
better … than on their midterm examination.
[T]he Halloun and Hestenes test is simple,
whereas the material covered by the examination … is, or so I thought, of far greater difficulty.” (Mazur 2007: 3)

Surprised that the Harvard students
fared no better than students at other, less
prestigious universities on the conceptual
inventory tests composed by Halloun and
Hestenes, Mazur decided to compose some
pairs of exam questions to use in his own
course. One member of each pair was a
“simple qualitative question” and the other
a “more difficult quantitative problem on
the same physical concept” (Mazur 2007:
4). Mazur gives an example pair of exam
questions with the results of scoring the
students’ performances on the two exam
items. The students in general did worse on
the “simple qualitative question” than on
the “more difficult quantitative problem.”
These results were repeated throughout
the course. In a number of cases students
scored zero on the qualitative question and
10 out of 10 on the quantitative problem.
Mazur’s initial responses are the following:
“ This simple example exposes a number of problems one faces in science education. First, it is

possible for students to do well on conventional
problems by memorizing algorithms without
understanding the underlying physics. Second,
as a result of this, it is possible for a teacher,
even an experienced one, to be completely misled into thinking that students have been taught
effectively. Students are subject to the same misconception: they believe they master the material and then are severely frustrated when they
discover that their plug-and-chug recipe doesn’t
work in a different problem.” (Mazur 2007: 5)

At about the same time as Mazur was
first realizing this, another Harvard faculty
member in education, Howard Gardner,
was publishing very similar observations.
“ …what an extensive research literature now
documents is that even an ordinary degree of
understanding is routinely missing in many,
perhaps most students. It is reasonable to expect
a college student to be able to apply in a new
context a law of physics, or a proof in geometry,
or the concept in history of which she has just
exhibited ‘acceptable mastery’ in her class. If,
when the circumstances of testing are slightly
altered, the sought-after competence can no
longer be documented, then understanding – in
any reasonable sense of the term – has simply
not been achieved. This state of affairs has seldom been acknowledged publicly…” (Gardner
1991: 6)

Mazur goes on to point out that a number of his experiences teaching physics and
observing the results of physics teaching,
which his existing explanatory schemes
did not exactly account for, now fell into
place with his new explanatory schemes
about learning. He was moved to devise a
new pedagogical practice for himself and
to write about it (see Mazur 2007).
I cannot vouch that Mazur, Gardner,
Halloun or Hestenes are RC. In fact from
their other works, from direct interaction
with them, and interaction with students
of Hestenes, I can say that neither Halloun
nor Hestenes would accept RC as a label of
their views of the nature of knowledge in
science or in physics education. However,
this does not disallow a radical constructivist explanation of Mazur’s conversion
experience. His attention was directed to
some new evidence he found he could not
deny. He could not explain this evidence

using his existing notions of teaching and
learning physics. His response to his disequilibration was to construct new notions
of teaching and learning physics, which resulted in a new pedagogical practice.3
It is not a matter of the advantages
of RC or even what some specific advantages might be. When people are wellentrenched in the normal science of an
existing paradigm, it is not sufficient to
show them a new paradigm and extol its
virtues. If such folk theory teaching actually worked, then Mazur and members of
the PER community would not find the
evidence of no change in understanding
that they have indeed found. Folk theory
teaching does not result in change in understanding. It is no surprise, then, that
the same approach does not work when
we try to interact with realists about our
position.
It is not about the logic we present to
them. Safe in their paradigm, everything
fits the evidence they have. They have to
perceive flaws in the paradigm themselves,
that there is undeniable, unavoidable evidence not accounted for by the paradigm.
In other words, they have to realize for
themselves a disequilbration between their
existing notions of the world and new experiences in the world, as Mazur did. Disequilibrations drive the need to change
world-view. Conditions have to be safe for
them to reconstruct and test their notions
of the world so that they can proceed to
do so.
If we wish scientists and philosophers
to construct for themselves an effective
understanding of RC, we need to direct
their attentions, in effective ways, to evidence (new experiences for them) that
they cannot account for with their existing
explanatory schemes. And, we must establish conditions that make it sufficiently
safe for them work on constructing and
testing new explanatory schemes.

3 | One RC-based pedagogy has been described in some detail (Dykstra 2005). It is briefly
described later in the paper in the section on
pedagogical objections to RC. Mazur describes
his pedagogy in (Mazur 2007).
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Can the objections
to RC be refuted
in a way that makes RC
more attractive to scientists
and philosophers?
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The short answer to this question is: No.
In their editorial the guest editors give a list
of objections frequently expressed about
RC, which include logical, ethical, social,
pedagogical and scientific objections. All
of these objections make perfect sense and
really are valid, but only from a realist position, not from the position of RC. It has
been pointed out that the basic assumptions
on which realism is based are profoundly
different than those on which RC is based
(Dykstra 2007). The two philosophical positions are incommensurate. What is meant
here by realism is described in quotations by
de la Torre & Zamorano and by von Glasersfeld in the previous section. Von Glasersfeld
has in several places set forth a description
of the difference between tradition (realism)
and RC. Here is one example:
“ What differentiates Radical Constructivism
from the tradition is the proposal unequivocally
to give up the notion that knowledge ought to be
a veridical ‘representation’ of a world as it ‘exists’
prior to being experienced (that is, ontological reality).” (Glasersfeld 1991: 16)

For the reader who might be a scientist
or philosopher, it should be noted that a
highly respected historian and philosopher
of science still active today, Jammer, suggested essentially the same thing in 1957, not so
much to establish a new philosophy, but as a
result of his examination of the histories of
ideas in physics.4 In the first two sentences
below, Jammer writes essentially the same
notion about the nature of knowledge as
Von Glasersfeld does above. Then, Jammer
goes on to describe implications for the status of explanatory knowledge in science:
“ As a result of modern research in physics, the
ambition and hope, still cherished by most authorities of the last century, that physical science
4 | Jammer studied the histories of concepts
in physics including: force, mass, time, simultaneity and quantum theory.
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could offer a photographic picture and true image of reality had to be abandoned. Science, as
understood today, has a more restricted objective:
its two major assignments are the description of
certain phenomena in the world of experience
and the establishment of general principles for
their prediction and what might be called their
‘explanation.’ ‘Explanation’ here means essentially
their subsumption under these principles. For
the efficient achievement of these two objectives
science employs a conceptual apparatus … This
conceptual apparatus consists of two parts: (1) a
system of concepts, definitions, axioms, and theorems, forming a hypothetico-deductive system, as
exemplified in mathematics by Euclidean geometry; (2) a set of relations linking certain concepts
of the hypothetico-deductive system with certain
data of sensory experience. With the aid of these
relations, which may be called “rules of interpretation” or “ epistemic correlations,” an association
is set up, for instance, between a black patch on a
photographic plate (a sensory impression) and a
spectral line of a certain wavelength (a conceptual
element or construct of the hypothetico-deductive system) …
“ The adoption of rules of interpretation introduces … an arbitrariness in the construction of
the system as a whole … In other words, arbitrary
modifications in the formation of the conceptual
counterparts to given sensory impressions can be
compensated by appropriate changes in the epistemic correlations without necessarily destroying
the correspondence with physical reality. In consequence of this arbitrariness, scientific concepts
‘are free creations of the human mind and are not,
however it may seem, uniquely determined by the
external world.’ (Einstein & Infeld, The Evolution
of Physics, 1938)” (Jammer 1957: 2–4)

One might ask, “What more do the objectors need?” An appropriate response to
this question is to point out that until the
objectors have been able to at least suspend
their realism-based judgment and have the
opportunity to construct a different understanding of the nature of knowing and
knowledge we know as RC, essentially none
of what we (or Jammer, Piaget, Von Glasersfeld, Ceccato, Vico, etc.) have to say in response will have any real effect on the objector’s thinking at all.
We have seen, in the pages of this journal and in countless debates on-line and at
meetings, that what we have to say in re-

sponse to the objections has no impact on
their thinking and they frequently do not
really hear what we are saying or patently
refuse to accept the simplest of statements
we have to offer. We say, for example: We are
not looking for objective truth. They say in
response: Yes, you are. You must be. From
such examples, can it be more clear that they
only know the world from a realist point of
view, hence they can only interpret what we
say from that same point of view?
Going back to the revised Proposition
1 describing RC, we must recognize that
neither we, as RC, nor the objectors to RC,
can in any way receive from outside ourselves by any physical means an explanation
of the world either in a realist or a radical
constructivist way of thinking. We can only
each construct our own explanations of any
attempt at communication based on our
own experiences, not those of the originator
of the communication signal.
Our situation interacting with realists
appears to be different than the realists’
situation. We have a repertoire of at least
two ways of thinking about knowing. We
all grew up immersed in a culture in which
realism is taken as given. Augmented by our
experiences in the RC vs. realism debates,
we have an understanding of how realism
works. This understanding of realism is
necessary. Without this understanding we
have no way of predicting when a realist
might find an experience a disequilibrating
surprise. Our understanding of RC enables
us to imagine possible experiences that can
be explained by RC but are not explained by
realism. Instead of debaters or combatants,
we need to be teachers who can use their
understanding of both RC and realism to
induce disequilibrations and then facilitate
constructive responses as the realists attempt to resolve the disequilibrations. The
answer is not folk theory teaching, realiststyle debates. The answer is RC pedagogical
practices exercised in the public sphere.
Let us examine possible RC understanding of the five categories of objection and
consider our understanding in relationship
to the realism of the objectors.

Logical objections

The apparent assumption in these objections as expressed in the list above is
that the point of all discussion and debate
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is to establish the truth of a proposition or
position. Humberto Maturana presents a
radical constructivist view of the purpose
of establishing the truth of a proposition or
position:
“ Whenever we want to compel somebody else to
do something according to our wishes, and we
cannot or do not want to use brutal force, we offer
what we claim is an objective rational argument.”
(Maturana 1988: 26)

This rational argument is supported by
the expectation that “the other cannot refuse what our argument claims because its
validity as such rests on its reference to the
real” and the realist claim that “that the real
is universally and objectively valid because
it is independent of what we do, and once it
is indicated it cannot be denied” (ibid: 26).
Furthermore, “whoever does not yield
to our rational arguments is arbitrary, illogical or absurd, [because] we have a privileged access to the reality that makes our
arguments objectively valid” (Ibid: 26).
While this attempt to establish the truth
need not be accompanied by physical violence, it is nonetheless psychologically and
cognitively violent.
The problem with the assumption in the
objection is that it has no place, no status in
RC. From the RC position, there can be no
objective, mind-independent truth attributed to any explanation. In RC neither the
realist explanation of knowledge nor the RC
explanation of knowledge can be argued as
truth. Instead in RC we assess the fit of an
explanation to the experiential evidence we
have. Better fit means a better explanation,
but better fit has no bearing on the truth,
relative truth or lack of objective truth of
such an explanation. Because, in the realist
paradigm, there is only the issue of objective truth, then anything else just has no
status. Until realists can see things from the
RC position, this distinction is totally lost
on them.
Technically, realists do not have to
abandon their old paradigm. But, they do
need to be able to see how an alternative
such as RC works and how to use it. Still,
to do this they must disequilibrate over evidence that cannot be explained in their existing paradigm. Revised Propositions 1 &
2 tell us this.

Ethical objections

Here the realist response to the RC position that objective truth cannot be known is
that without objective truth there is no basis
for decisions with respect to anything. Here
in particular, with respect to ethics, from
this realist position RC is the ultimate in
relativism, a kind of polar opposite to realism. Hence the realist characterization of
RC: anything goes, laissez-faire. This realist
characterization of RC is the only alternative the realist has to objectivism. This is a
realist construction of the world. Sadly, this
construction does not allow the realist to
understand RC from within realism.
Realists are so focused, by blinders, on
truth that they fail to hear in RC the part
about formulating an explanation that fits
evidence. This means there are necessarily
limits on explanations in RC, which would
include ethical theory. The only ideology,
theory, or explanation that a radical constructivist can support is one that fits the
evidence, experience in the field.5 If that
happens to be a different ideology than that
promoted by another as truth, then that person might label the RCs ideology as reactionary, but then the RC could say the same
about the other. Such labels are vacuous and
non sequitur.
Yet again, we see in this type of objection realists who cannot see the world from
any other position than their own, but this
is exactly what is necessary for them in order to understand the RC response. Revised
proposition 2 addresses what will be necessary in order for the realists to develop another point of view than the one they are
working with.

Social objections

“Cannot” is quite a different claim than
“has not,” but “cannot” would logically include “has not.” The claim, “has not,” cannot
be applied until all the necessary scholarship
has been carried out. In fact, there is work in
sociological studies and in ethics from RC’s
and related points of view (e.g., Piaget 1995;
5 | Maturana wrote an extensive document
that touches both on ethics and social interactions
(Maturana 1988). There are some small distinctions between Maturana’s position and RC, but
there is little if any for a radical constructivist to
disagree within this document.

Maturana 1988).6 Hence, the claim that RC
cannot explain social structures and society
is the result of poor scholarship at best.
It is possible that this objection is the
result of additional poor scholarship. In the
English-speaking science education community, Piaget’s work first became known in
the 1960s. Piaget’s focus was on the origins
and development of human knowing. In the
1980s Vygotsky’s work was becoming known
in the English-speaking science education
community. Vygotsky studied the cultural
influence on learning via established cultural interactions between mother and child,
teachers and students, children playing with
each other, etc. Piaget’s work led him to develop a different notion of the nature and
results of human knowing. Vygotsky apparently did not question the accepted realist
nature of knowledge. Thus, Piaget was RC
and Vygotsky remained realist.
Those who did not understand Piaget
from the RC point of view found objections
to Piaget’s ideas. When Vygotsky’s work was
introduced to them, his work easily found
a home with them. Because of the chronological order in which they were introduced, many decided that Vygotsky came
after Piaget then extended and corrected his
work from the individual to the social. This
misses the points that Piaget was RC and
Vygotsky was realist and that both considered and studied both individuals and social
situations. Significantly, both Piaget and Vygotsky were born in the same year, 1896, but
Vygotsky died in 1934 while Piaget lived and
worked until 1980.7
6 | In RC all explanatory knowledge exists
only in the mind. For it to exist there, since it does
not exist independently of the mind, it must be
constructed in the mind. It is constructed to fit experience. This experience can be physical, social
or internal. In physics we engage students over
their explanatory knowledge of the experiences of
the physical “world.” We construct what culture
and social interactions are to us in the same way
and for essentially the same reasons as we construct understanding of the physical world. Our
internal experiences are our experiences with our
own thinking.
7 | What appears here is an abbreviation of a
more extensive discussion on the work of Piaget
and its relationship to Vygotsky’s work, which can
be found in Chapter 13 in Fuller et al. (2009).
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While better scholarship on the part of
all would help resolve this situation with respect to social objections to RC, it is still the
case that to understand RC work and theory
in social structures and society, one needs to
understand the RC position. This can only
happen if revised Proposition 2 is taken into
account.
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These objections to constructivist teaching are one of the many strategies used to
discourage people who work in the field
of education and teacher preparation from
leaving the folk theory of teaching. While it
is the case that there may be those who have
actually advocated and tried to practice
such idiocy as laissez-faire in the classroom,
such a notion of teaching and learning is
distinctly not RC. As was pointed out above,
in realism there is only truth and not truth,
maybe in addition something like closerto-the-truth, but nothing else. The realist
reaction to RC, without understanding RC,
is to assume absolute solipsism and relativity are what RC is about, hence the anything
goes or laissez-faire idea. For the realist,
the notion of unknowable objective reality screams so loudly in the mind that the
notion of explanation that fits experience is
completely drowned out. This requirement
of fit renders any RC pedagogy decidedly
not laissez-faire.
A more detailed discussion of RC-consistent pedagogy, its contrast with folk-theory (realist) pedagogy and a comparison of
the learning results of both can be found in
Dykstra (2005). Clearly there is a role for the
teacher, but that role is not that of presenter
or arbiter of truth or even what is closer to
truth, as we can see from the quotations
from McKinnon & Renner and from Arons
in the opening section of this paper. Instead
the assignment of the teacher is to:
 direct the students’ attentions to their
own conceptions that they apply to a
new experience to make a specific prediction when this experience does not
behave as they expect,
 make it safe for the students to construct
or reconstruct explanatory schemes to
account for these surprising experiences,
 keep students attending to the fit between their explanatory schemes and all
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of their experiences subsumed by these
schemes, and
 engage the students in using the power
of interactions between each other over
their ideas and the testing of their ideas
against the evidence.
Again, from this type of objection, we
see the evidence that RC activities are critiqued from the traditional realist paradigm.
Our revised Propositions tell us what we
have to facilitate: the realist must disequilibrate over a self-identified perception of a
mismatch between his explanatory schemes
and his experiences, then work to construct
and test new explanatory schemes against
the experiences. RC does not give us any alternative to this.

Scientific objections

Again, we see in the scientific objections
to the view that there is no truth, then we
have no anchor and all is lost. This is realists seeing RC as absolute solipsism and
total relativism because RC denies that we
can know the truth of any explanation we
make up and test against evidence. Realists
apparently know only, and can see nothing
else but, truth and gradations from true all
the way to, and only to, not true. For realists, nothing else exists. It is as if they need
a security blanket of truth to have any idea
about the physical world.
A second, but equally important, part of
the objection is buried in the idea that mere
constructs of individual human minds could
not possibly be successful at guiding engineers and at having the predictive power the
scientific community relies upon. This notion is indicative of a kind of destructive elitism amongst many scientists. We, the true
practitioners of science, are smarter than the
rest of a society which cannot really understand the science we have figured out.
When a scientist approaches you with
this elitism, beware. For such a scientist, his
or her ego is far more important than anything or anyone else. Such notions are part
of the indoctrination into science delivered
largely via folk theory teaching with its emphasis on the notion that only certain people
are truly deserving or capable of science (cf.
Dykstra 2007: 54).
The problem with these notions for scientists is that for such an idea, science works
on the basis of discovering truth; there is no

evidence in all of the history of science that
any explanatory system survived the challenges of all subsequent experience with the
phenomenon in question. This “scientific”
objection is another failure in scholarship.
One might think that the designation,
Ph.D., Doctor of Philosophy in a field, would
require such scholarship. Sadly, most Ph.D.s
today are doctorates in the technical practice of a field. Not only is there no explicit
philosophy of the field, such philosophy is
actively shunned, avoided, and discouraged
in the indoctrination of new scientists.
Nonetheless, it is entirely consistent with
all we know of the history of science when
we argue that scientists struggle to construct
explanations that fit the evidence and have
predictive power. This is entirely consistent
with the revised Propositions of RC.
One more time, the revised Propositions
of RC tell us what has to happen in order
that realists might understand our characterization, our explanations, to see how our
responses refute their objections. Just as we
are able to understand how the realist paradigm works, as well as our own, the realist
must be able to do the same. Our propositions tell us that disequilibration is required
of the single-paradigm realist. Our only
hope is to find ways of effectively directing
the realist’s attention to something that she
cannot explain from her realist paradigm.

Conclusion
The proposal herein to revise the propositions defining RC in part is an effort to
emphasize the adjective “radical” proposed
by von Glasersfeld. He suggested that we
categorize the constructivisms into two
groups according to the scholarly meaning
of the two proposed labels. For constructivisms that depart little, if at all, from the basic
assumptions of realism, von Glasersfeld proposed the label “trivial”, not in the sense of
insignificant as a whole, but to mean no real
shift away from realism in its basic assumptions about the nature of knowledge. What
is meant here by realism is given in several
places already in this piece. The other category of constructivisms makes fundamental shifts away from the basic assumptions
about the nature of knowledge at the roots of
realism. There are profoundly different basic

Radical Constructivism

Radical Constructivism Has an Answer Dewey I. Dykstra, Jr.

{

assumptions about the nature and status of
knowledge at the root of the matter for realism and for RC. Von Glasersfeld proposed
the adjective “radical” in the scholarly sense
of differentiated at its root from realism, for
the category of constructivisms that fit this
description. The quotation given above near
the beginning of Section III, gives Von Glasersfeld’s view on the RC departure from
realism.
The guest editors suggest that today “the
literature is populated by a large number of
different theories, which are often in mutual disagreement, that all label themselves
as some variety of ‘constructivism.’ They all
seem to agree with proposition 1, but to a
much lesser degree with proposition 2”
(Riegler & Quale 2010: 1). Following von
Glasersfeld’s classification scheme, a constructivism that agrees with the original
proposition 1 but not proposition 2 probably is not a radical but a trivial constructivism. To accept a consequence of RC does
not require an acceptance of what necessitates the consequence in the first place.
Such a constructivism, at its heart, can still
hold that objective truth is knowable and
that there are right explanations in science
and philosophy. This is particularly easy
to discern when one examines a proposed
“constructivist” pedagogy. Among the clues
for a trivial constructivist pedagogy are
the notions that student’s conceptions are
taken as wrong and need to be corrected to
the right answer, that students discover the
truth out there in nature, or that students
must be guided to the truth or right answer
because they could never figure it out for
themselves.

Dewey I. Dykstra, Jr.

is Professor of Physics and Coordinator of Physics Teacher Education in the Physics Department at
Boise State University in Boise, ID. His first disequilibration on the path to RC happened shortly after
he started teaching in 1969. This initial disequilibration was resolved 8 years later when he read
an article on Piaget (Fuller, Karplus & Lawson 1977). Understanding Piaget’s theory of cognitive
equilibration opened the door to radical constructivism. His work as a physicist has engaged
him in studies of how, why and under what circumstances student change their conceptions of
physical phenomena. He has applied conclusions from these studies, testing his understanding
of RC, to the development of an RC-consistent pedagogy and instructional materials.

In the editorial to this issue, the guest
editors write: “It appears that the theory of
RC is simply (too) provocative for many
people” (Riegler & Quale 2010: 2). Why is
this?” First, one could point out that any
paradigm would appear provocative if it
is not understood. Why is RC provocative
to many people? Obviously, many people
do not understand RC and have never really experienced coming to see the world
from another position. This is a very sad
outcome of the folk theory that passes for
education.
What is the answer to these problems
and challenges we face? RC explains not
only why these problems and challenges are
happening, but also what can be done about
them. If we recognize that understanding,
meaning, and explanation exist only in the
mind and not in any physical form, then
we have to accept that our understanding,
meaning, and explanation cannot be presented so that others without sufficiently
similar understanding, meaning, and explanation will “get” what we present. This is no
different when we are presenting RC than
when we try to present the meaning of force
when teaching about Newton’s laws. As Arnold Arons points out above, such presentations are futile. They leave no impression on
the intellect of the listener.
What then must we do? RC tells us
why and under what circumstances people
change their explanatory schemes for the
world. They change their explanatory systems in response to their perception of
disequilibration between their explanatory
schemes and their experiences in the world
in order to restore equilibrium. Until this

re-equilibration happens, people “see” and
“hear” the world through their previously
existing explanatory schemes.
If we try to interact with them using
RC explanatory schemes that do not match
theirs, it is certain they will not experience
the interaction from a radical constructivist
position but from a realist position instead.
Under these circumstances we are doomed
not to be understood. The listeners have to
construct for themselves new understandings that sufficiently appear to match our
RC understanding before we can expect the
interactions to indicate they are taking our
contributions to any debates in the radical
constructivist sense we intend.
Again, this is no different than a radical
constructivist pedagogy in which students
construct new understandings of motion and
force (Dykstra 2005). The problem in our arena is that we do not have the teacher-student
relationship with our realist colleagues. This
requires more patience, more persistence,
and more resourcefulness in creating situations in which our realist colleagues might
disequilibrate.
Will RC become mainstream? The skeptics first wrote their ideas nearly 2500 years
ago, although these ideas were probably not
continuously available in western society
for that full time. In the Buddhist culture,
an equivalent philosophy to RC, called “the
Middle Way,” has also been available for
2500 years, probably nearly continuously in
their culture. In neither setting can we call
RC or the Middle Way mainstream.
We can safely say that if RC became
mainstream, the world would be very different. Most of us would also agree that if this
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were to happen, that different world would
be a much better place for all to live in.
Why does realism have such hegemonic
hold? It is impressed on everyone by language and our cultural institutions, not the
least of which today are our schools. RC tells
us that change in how we see the world can
happen. We see evidence that there have
been such changes, at least, in the history of
science.
Will RC ever become mainstream?
Not unless we actually use RC instead of
falling into the realist trap of debates.
If we don’t use what RC tells us
about change in understanding,
then who will? If not now, when will we try?
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